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Abstract. The history of the axiomatic approach to the ranking of innite
streams starts with Koopmans' (1960) characterization of the discounted util-
itarian rule. This rule, however, meets Chichilnisky's axiom of dictatorship of
the present and puts future generations oside. Recently, Lauwers (2010a) and
Zame (2007) have uncovered the impossibility to combine in a constructible
way the requirements of equal treatment, sensitivity, and completeness.
This contribution presents and discusses dierent axioms proposed to guide the
ranking of innite streams and the criteria they imply. The literature covered
in this overview denitely points towards a set of meaningful alternatives to
discounted utilitarianism.
JEL Classication Number: D71, D81.
1 Introduction
Global environmental issues|like biodiversity conservation or climate change|are in re-
ality long term issues that are not properly taken into account with traditional models
that incorporate the impatience axiom manifested in xed discount factors and in the use
of present discounted utility criteria.
This social impatience conicts with the utilitarian tradition of moral philosophy where
it is recommended to treat dierent generations equally. As Sidgwick (1907, p414) writes:
\the time at which a man exists cannot aect the value of his happiness from a universal
point of view; and [...] the interests of posterity must concern a utilitarian as much as those
of his contemporaries." Ramsey (1928), in one of the rst formal studies on the evaluation
of social welfare in an intertemporal framework, strongly endorses this view. Despite this
position, he nevertheless introduces a rate of discount in some of the investigations. Simply
because undiscounted utilitarianism provides no unique answer in case the maximum total
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welfare is innite and this innite value is achieved by many feasible paths. Later on, the
same doubt on the sustainability of the equal treatment principle occurs when Koopmans
(1960) characterizes the discounted utilitarian rule on the basis of ve appealing axioms.
Section 3 recalls this result of Koopmans.
It is only recently (Lauwers 2010a, Zame 2007) that the deep cause of the conict
as experienced by Ramsey and Koopmans was exposed: it is not possible to dene in
a \constructive" way a complete ranking on the set of innite consumption paths that
combines anonymity (an axiom that captures equal treatment) and Pareto (or sensitivity).1
Since the question of how to evaluate policies that involve the distant future is normative,
it should by no means be answered through \non-constructive" mathematics such as the
Axiom of Choice or Szpilrajn's Lemma.2 Only constructible and well dened criteria can
take part in the discussions. The inevitable implication, then, is that at most two of
the three requirements|completeness, anonymity, and Pareto|are compatible. Either
one has to drop the requirement of completeness, or one has to weaken the requirement
of anonymity and/or Pareto. Anyway, one cannot but accept the above incompatibility
and temper the ambition to nd a representable ordering (as encapsulated in Koopmans'
postulates). Incompleteness of the criterion should be interpreted as a consequence of an
unbiased position in the discussion. In order to leave as many options open, the primitive
should be a partial ordering. Section 4 starts with the introduction of Diamond's axiom of
equal treatment and closes with the statement and the interpretation of the Lauwers-Zame
impossibility theorem.
Sections 5 and 6 show two dierent routes to extend in a constructive way a sequence of
nite dimensional orderings towards a partial ordering on the set of innite streams. If the
nite dimensional orderings all satisfy anonymity and Pareto, then the resulting innite
dimensional partial ordering inherits both these properties.
Section 7 drops the Pareto principle, strengthens anonymity, imposes completeness and
a restricted form of monotonicity, and discusses rules in the Rawlsian spirit such as the
inmum rule and the limit inferior. Also, the rank-discounted utilitarian rule (Zuber and
Asheim 2012) is discussed. Although each of these rules violates the weakest form of
Pareto, they may be extremely useful in a two step procedure as proposed by Ferejohn and
Page (1978, p274):
Our result suggests that the search for a fair rate of discount is a vain one. In-
stead of searching for the right number, i.e. `the' social rate of discount, we must
look to broader principles of social choice to incorporate ideas of intertemporal
equity. Once found, these principles might be used as side conditions in a dis-
counting procedure to rule out gross inequities that can arise with discounting,
even with a low discount rate
1In his review on intergenerational equity, Asheim (2010, section 3.2) coins this result as the Lauwers-
Zame impossibility theorem.
2I want to mention already here that the combination of continuity with respect to the sup-topology
and representability does not guarantee that the ranking rule is constructible. The other way around, the
representation of a non-constructible ordering, is in itself a non-constructible object.
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A strongly anonymous welfare function might indeed be used as a rst step. As a strongly
anonymous welfare function typically has thick levels sets, a second step can further inves-
tigate the set of optimal paths obtained in the rst.
Sections 8 and 9 return to social welfare functions. At the center of the sustainable
discounted utilitarian rule (Asheim and Mitra 2010) is the axiom of Hammond equity
for the future, according to which a sustained improvement at the cost of the present
generation is considered an improvement only in case this rst generation is ex post still the
better o. They succeed in modifying the axioms of Koopmans towards a characterization.
Finally, Chichilnisky (1996, 1997) introduces the axioms of non-dictatorship of the present
and non-dictatorship of the future. She proposes a convex combination of the discounted
utilitarian rule and a map that captures the limiting behavior of an innite stream. The
discounted rule prevents the future from dictatorship, the limit-part prevents the present
from dictatorship. She coins those social welfare functions as sustainable preferences.
This overview is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces notation and describes the
problem. The next sections unfold as described above. As the focus is on the axiomatic
approach, we recall and discuss dierent appealing properties or axioms. William Thomson
(2001, p349) motivates as follows:
The objective of the axiomatic program is to give as detailed as possible a
description of the implications of properties of interest, singly or in combination,
and in particular to trace out the boundary that separates combinations of
properties that are compatible from combinations of properties that are not.
Applied to the ranking of innite streams, one investigates on what ethical conditions
various ranking criteria are based and proceeds to evaluate the normative appeal of these
conditions. Although not included in this overview, the alternative approach that confronts
the criteria with dierent technological environments and compares the properties of the
intergenerational well-being streams that are generated, is undoubtedly a necessary route
in the debate.3
2 Notation
We consider a model with successive generations, each generation living exactly one period.
Time is discrete and starts with period 1. Let N = f1; 2; : : : ; t; : : :g be the set of natural
numbers, R the set of real numbers, and let Y be a subset of R. Let X be the innite
cartesian product Y N. A sequence x = (x1; x2; : : : ; xt; : : :) in X is said to be an innite
stream of generational well-being, for each t in N the real number xt indicates the average
well-being of generation t. The indicator of well-being is assumed to be at least ordinally
measurable and level comparable across generations. Also, for each generation, the distri-
bution of resources among the individuals of a same generation is neglected. Furthermore,
the population size is assumed to be given and constant over time.
3Section 3 provides a simple example to indicate that paths optimal with respect to a sustainable-
equitable approach might dier substantially from optima generated by the discounted utilitarian rule.
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For each n in N and for each x in X, we write x = (x n; x+n) with x n = (x1; x2; : : : ; xn)
and x+n = (xn+1; xn+2; : : :). Note that x 1 = (x1). For each x and y in X, we write
 x  y if xt  yt for each t in N,
 x > y if x  y and x 6= y,
 x y if xt > yt for each t in N,
 ds(x; y) = supt in N jxt   ytj.
The dierent inequalities will be used to formulate axioms of monotonicity, the distance
function ds generates the sup-topology and is used to formulate an axiom of continuity.
The object we look for is a partial social welfare ordering, denoted by %, on the set X
of innite streams. That is, % is a relation in X, and x % y means that the innite stream
x is at least as good as y. The relation % is assumed to be (i) transitive, for each x, y,
and z in X, we have that x % y and y % z implies x % z, and (ii) reexive, for each x in
X, we have that x % x. The symmetric and the asymmetric parts of % are denoted by 
and . The partial ordering %e is said to extend the partial ordering %, or % is said to
be a subrelation to %e, in case, for each x and y in X, x  y implies x e y and x  y
implies x e y.
The term social welfare order refers to a partial social welfare ordering % that is com-
plete, i.e. for each x and y in X, we have x % y or y % x. The term social welfare function
refers to a map f : X ! R that represents some social welfare order %: for each x and y
in X, we have f(x)  f(y) if and only if x % y. Recall that in view of the Lauwers-Zame
impossibility result, completeness (or representability) is not a neutral requirement as it
already excludes the combination of the axioms of anonymity and Pareto.
3 Discounted utilitarianism
Tjalling Charles Koopmans (1972b)4 considers a social welfare order % on the set of al
bounded consumption streams, i.e. innite streams for which the supremum and the in-
mum are both nite,5 and investigates the next ve postulates.
Continuity. The relation % is continuous with respect to the sup-topology, i.e. the topol-
ogy generated by the distance function ds.
Sensitivity. There exist innite streams x and y = (y1; x+1) such that x  y.
The next axiom appeals to the following rankings generated by % and some xed
reference stream z = (z1; z2; z3; : : : ; zt; : : :). The orderings %z+1 on Y , %z+2 on Y 2, and
%z 1 on X are dened by
4See also Koopmans (1960, 1965, 1972a) and Koopmans et al (1964).
5For simplicity, Y = R, xt is the consumption of generation t, and the set `1 of bounded streams takes
the role of X.
4
 for each x and y in Y , we write x %z+1 y if (x; z+1) % (y; z+1),
 for each (x1; x2) and (y1; y2) in Y 2,
we write (x1; x2) %z+2 (y1; y2) if (x1; x2; z+2) % (y1; y2; z+2), and
 for each x and y in X, we write x+1 %z 1 y+1 if (z1; x+1) % (z1; y+1).
Independence. The three orderings, %z+1 on Y , %z+2 on Y 2, and %z 1 on X, do not
depend on the reference stream z.
Stationarity0. There exists an x

1 in Y such that
(x1; x2; x3; : : : ; xt; : : :) % (x1; y2; y3; : : : ; yt; : : :)
if and only if
(x2; x3; : : : ; xt; : : :) % (y2; y3; : : : ; yt; : : :):
Monotonicity.6 Let x and y in Y satisfy xt  yt for each t in N. Then, x % y.
We briey discuss these ve axioms. Koopmans (1972a) motivates the continuity ax-
iom: a small change in a prospect cannot drastically change the position of that prospect in
the ranking of all other prospects. Continuity in combination with a monotonicity axiom
that imposes x  y in case x > y and x % y in case x  y implies that the ranking % is
representable by a real valued function (Diamond 1965, Lauwers 1997a).7 The usefulness
of a representation by a continuous function lies primarily in the availability of stronger
mathematical techniques.8 Sensitivity excludes the ordering % from being trivial in the
sense that all innite streams are equally good. This axiom also prohibits dictatorship
of the future (see section 9): the ranking of innite streams is not solely based upon the
limiting behavior of the innite streams. Independence removes all complementarity be-
tween the well-being of dierent (subsequent) generations, cannot be regarded as a realistic
assumption, and should be looked upon as a way to facilitate the investigations (Koop-
mans 1972b, p83).9 Independence implies that the particular value x in the axiom of
stationarity0 can be replaced with any value in Y . In case the axiom of independence is
imposed upon the ranking %, stationarity0 strengthens to the next axiom.
Stationarity. For each x1 in Y we have
(x1; x2; x3; : : : ; xt; : : :) % (x1; y2; y3; : : : ; yt; : : :)
6Koopmans considers innite streams of vectors instead of scalars. The axiom of monotonicity is a
one-dimensional version of Koopmans' axiom.
7Diamond (1965) follows Gerard Debreu (1954) to prove this result.
8This motivation, however, is wrong in case the continuous social welfare function represents a non-
constructible order.
9See also Fleurbaey and Michel (2003, Section 3.4).
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if and only if
(x2; x3; : : : ; xt; : : :) % (y2; y3; : : : ; yt; : : :):
Stationarity compares innite streams with a common rst period value in the same
way as the innite streams that are obtained by deleting these rst period values and
advancing the timing of all subsequent values by one period. Repeated use of stationarity
results in comparing two streams (x t; x+t) and (x t; y+t) with the common head x t in
the same way as the innite tails x+t and y+t. In other words, if the rst t generations are
not aected the ranking is made as if the present time (date 1) actually was in time t. The
passage of time has no eect on preferences. Stationarity also implies that the ranking
of two innite streams is not altered if both streams are postponed by one unit of time
and identical values are plugged in at time period 1. Monotonicity demands that if each
generation is at least as good o in x than in y, the innite stream x should be considered
at least as good as y.
These ve postulates characterize the discounted utilitarian rule.
Theorem 1 (Koopmans 1972b).10 Let the social welfare ordering % on the set of bounded
streams satisfy continuity with respect to the sup-topology, sensitivity, independence,
stationarity0, and monotonicity. Then, the ordering % is represented by a continuous
function
D : (x1; x2; : : : ; xt; : : :) 7 ! (1  )
1X
t=1
t 1u(xt);
with u nowhere decreasing and continuous and with  in the open interval (0; 1).11
A rst step towards this result investigates the representation of % restricted to the
subset of innite streams with a xed tail, say z+t. Next, the domain of innite streams
with a constant tail is considered. The partial results are then generalized towards the full
domain of bounded streams. Discounted utilitarianism satises a recursive relation:
D(x1; x2; : : : ; xt; : : :) = (1  )u(x1) + D(x2; x3; : : : ; xt+1; : : :);
for each innite stream x. The map D attaches the weight 1  to the utility allocated to
the present period and the complementary weight  to the aggregated utility of all future
periods.
Although (Koopmans 1965, Section 6) holds an ethical preference for neutrality, he
provides an argument for the discounted utilitarian rule:
We admit to an ethical preference for neutrality as between the welfare of
dierent generations. ... A previous investigation has shown that there does
10Dierent axiomatizations are obtained by Lauwers (1997c), Bleichrodt et al (2008), and Asheim et al
(2012).
11The factor (1   ) in the denition of D ensures that D(x; x; : : : ; x; : : :) = u(x). Hence, the weights
with which the u(xt) are multiplied add up to 1.
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not exist a utility function of all consumptions paths, which at the same time
exhibits timing neutrality and satises other reasonable postulates which all
utility functions used sofar have agreed with.
The mathematical conict between neutrality and the ve postulates overrules the ethical
preference for neutrality. In his 1975 Nobel Memorial Lecture, Koopmans (1977) returns
to the issue of a positive discount factor:
Thus, the impatience expressed by a positive discount rate merely denies to un-
counted distant generations a permanently higher level of consumption because
that would necessitate a substantially smaller present consumption. Perhaps a
pity, but not a sin.
Kenneth Joseph Arrow (1999) considers a world in which an investment by the rst
generation generates a perpetual stream of benets. The undiscounted total gain exceeds
the nite loss to the rst generation, and the optimal path would almost sacrice the
rst generation. He concludes \that the strong ethical requirement that all generations be
treated alike, itself reasonable, contradicts a very strong intuition that it is not morally
acceptable to demand excessively high saving rates of any one generation, or even every
generation." This argument, however, assumes a non-decreasing path and leaves open the
case where a period of economic growth is followed by a period of economic regression.
Then, the `small sin' might take problematic proportions.
The set of ve axioms leads to the `class' of discounted utilitarian rules. The axioms,
however, do not pass any judgment about the value of  and the particular form of u. Let
us illustrate the eect of a change in . The next table (Fleurbaey and Zuber 2012, Table
1) considers  equal to 0:9862 and 0:9737 and shows the minimum return a one dollar
investment for the future should have to be considered better than consuming it now.
 = 0:9862  = 0:9737 ratio
time period 50 2:00 3:79 1:89
time period 100 4:02 14:36 3:57
time period 200 16:13 206:11 12:78
time period 1000 1 091 327:24 371 914 916 666:52 340 791.38
The minimal return sucient to defend a one dollar investment today.
The value r = (1=) 1 has the interpretation of a discount rate,  = 0:9862 (resp. 0:9737)
corresponds to r = 1:4% (resp. 2:7%). The nal column has the following alternative
interpretation. When the discount rate r jumps from 1.4 to 2.7 percent the minimal return
that is sucient to defend a one dollar investment at year 1 at the benet of year 200
becomes 12.78 times larger. The huge ratios in the nal column show the impact of a
change in the discount rate.
We close this section with a simple example illustrating the shortsightedness of the
time-discounted utilitarian approach (Lauwers 2012). Consider an economy in which trees
are a necessary input to production or consumption. The dynamics of tree reproduction
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are as follows. If n out of 2n subsequent generations cut the forest at a maximal rate,
the species become extinct after the 2n'th generation, in which case there is zero utility at
every period from then on. Assume this strategy results in utility streams of the form un =
(0:1; 0:1; : : : ; 0:1; 1; 1; : : : ; 1; 0; 0; : : :) with the rst (resp. last) 1 at the n + 1 (resp. 2n)'th
place, in which generations n + 1; : : : ; 2n cut at a full capacity and exhaust the forest.
When the consumption of the forest is delayed and n becomes larger, the forest slightly
expands and more generations can benet. Alternatively, generations can invest in the
forest and only cut at an equilibrium rate which allows the forest to survive. This strategy
results in the utility stream u1 = (:25; :25; : : : ; :25; : : :) in which each generation reaches
the same utility level. Optimization with respect to a discounted utilitarian rule leads
to the elimination of the forest.12 If the long term future is considered important, the
constant stream u1 should be ranked strictly above a stream where within a nite horizon
the forest is consumed.
As already mentioned, it is a natural step in the axiomatic approach to confront the
rule characterized through a set of axioms with the consequences is generates in specic
environments outcome. In case a set of desirable axioms leads to undesirable consequences,
there is always the invitation to reconsider the axioms. This iterative process between
moral principles and their examination in particular models is supported by, for example,
Atkinson (2001). Dasgupta and Heal (1979) state
... it is legitimate to revise or criticize ethical norms in the light of their impli-
cations.
As such, the above example motivates the search for alternatives to the discounted utili-
tarian rule.
4 Finite anonymity
Peter Arthur Diamond (1965) continues the axiomatic approach initiated by Koopmans.
He considers innite utility streams: xt is the one period utility level associated with
consumption in period t and Y is the closed interval [0; 1]. In order to investigate whether
or not impatience is unavoidable when ranking innite streams, he introduces the next
axiom. Let % be a partial order on the set X.
Finite anonymity. For each x = (x1; x2; : : : ; xt; : : :) in X and for each t in N, we have
x  xt = (xt; x2; : : : ; xt 1; x1; xt+1; : : :):
The innite stream xt is obtained from x by switching the coordinates x1 and xt. Due to
the transitivity of %, a nitely anonymous evaluation is indierent between two innite
streams that are equal up to a nite number switches in the coordinates. A ranking% which
12The map x 7! (1  )(x1 +  x2 +   + t 1xt +    ) obtains a maximal value, equal to :3025, in one
of the streams of type tn; while the stream u1 obtains a lower value of :25.
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treats all generations equally should satises this condition. Diamond keeps the axiom of
continuity with respect to the sup-topology and imposes the following strengthening of the
axiom of sensitivity.
Strong Pareto. For each x and y in X, we have x  y as soon x > y.
The imposition of strong Pareto requires that the welfare ordering judges a utility
stream superior to another as soon at least one period obtains a higher utility while all
other periods obtain at least the same utility. This ability to detect an improvement in a
single period makes strong Pareto a very demanding axiom in the study of innite streams.
The combination of nite anonymity and strong Pareto generates a partial social welfare
ordering: the Suppes-Sen grading principle considers the innite stream x at least as good
as y in case it is possible to obtain from x by means of a nite number of switches a
stream x0 that Pareto dominates y, i.e. x0  y. Hence, each partial social welfare ordering
that satises nite anonymity and strong Pareto extends the Suppes-Sen grading principle.
Furthermore, recall that a complete, strongly Paretian, and continuous (with respect to
the sup-topology) social welfare relation is representable by a continuous real valued map.
The following theorem, a result that Diamond attributes to Yaari, reveals a fundamental
conict.
Theorem 2 (Diamond 1965). There does not exist a social welfare order % on the set X
that satises continuity, strong Pareto, and nite anonymity.
This impossibility result has been the starting point of an extensive literature on its
robustness. The axiom of continuity with respect to the sup-topology is, in contrast to
strong Pareto and nite anonymity, a rather technical condition. Furthermore, as dif-
ferent distance functions generate dierent notions of continuity, the axiom of continuity
is manipulable. For example, with respect to the discrete topology on X, each ordering
% becomes continuous and continuity becomes an empty concept. Therefore, axioms of
continuity in the innite dimensional framework are considered as controversial. Svens-
son (1980) shows the existence of a complete and transitive relation that combines strong
Pareto, nite anonymity, and a very weak continuity requirement. Basu and Mitra (2003)
insist on representability by a real valued function, drop continuity, and obtain again an
impossibility result. Fleurbaey and Michel (2003) consider the following Pareto axiom.
Weak Pareto. For each x and y in X, we have (i) x % y as soon x  y and (ii) x  y as
soon x y.
Weak Pareto strengthens monotonicity: a utility stream is considered at least as good
as another as soon each period obtains at least the same utility. Furthermore, according
to weak Pareto a utility stream is superior to another as soon each period obtains a higher
utility. A ranking that satises strong Pareto also satises weak Pareto. Fleurbaey and
Michel (2003) strengthen Diamond's theorem: a social welfare ordering cannot simulta-
neously satisfy continuity with respect to the sup-topology, nite anonymity, and weak
Pareto.
9
A deep result in this track of research was conjectured by Fleurbaey and Michel (2003)
and conrmed by Lauwers (2010a) and Zame (2007). We present the discrete version with
Y = f0; 1g. A discrete version of the Pareto principle is needed.
Intermediate Pareto. For each x and y in X, we have (i) x % y as soon x  y and (ii)
x  y as soon xi > yi for innitely many i in N.
Theorem 3 (Lauwers 2010a). A partial order on the set X = f0; 1gN of innite utility
streams made up of zeros and ones that satises intermediate Pareto and nite anonymity
either is incomplete, or is a non-constructive object (and hence has no explicit description).
This theorem considers only two levels of utility. Then, intermediate Pareto is the
weakest version of Pareto that is non-trivial. In this limited framework a partial order is
unable to combine (in a constructive way) completeness, intermediate Pareto, and nite
anonymity.
With respect to the change from a continuous towards a discrete setting, one might
argue that there exists a smallest unit (or quantum) of utility and that a discrete level
set Y is natural. In such a framework, intermediate Pareto seems appropriate. If the
set Y of utility levels is equal to N, then the map X ! R : x 7! mint x (and the map
x 7! lim inf x as well) denes a complete, nitely anonymous, and weakly Paretian order
on X that violates intermediate Pareto. If, however, the set Y is the unit interval [0; 1],
the minimum of an innite stream is not well dened while the map x 7! inft x violates
weak Pareto. Indeed, the streams
x = (1; 1=2; : : : ; 1=n; : : :) and y = (0; 0; : : : ; 0; : : :)
dominate each other (x  y) while they have the same inmum (and the same limit
inferior). This kind of situations do not occur in a discrete setting.13 Intermediate Pareto
and minimum should be seen as the discrete analogue to weak Pareto and inmum.
The above theorem appeals to the concept of constructibility. In order to explain
this, consider Brouwer's xed theorem: each continuous function from a convex compact
subset of a Euclidean space to itself has a xed point. A well known proof of this result
is based on algebraic topology and is not constructive: the proof shows the existence of
a xed point but does not specify where it is located. Only later on constructive proofs,
algorithms to detect the location of a xed point, were provided. Theorem 3 is in the
same spirit. Svensson (1980) already showed the existence of a complete and transitive
relation that combines strong Pareto and nite anonymity. Svensson's proof, however, uses
the Axiom of Choice, which is within the axiomatic setup of set theory in mathematics
a non-constructive axiom. Theorem 3 shows the impossibility to provide a constructive
proof of Svensson's result. The use of a non-constructive axiom (in the spirit of the Axiom
of Choice) cannot be avoided to obtain Svensson's result. As a consequence, Svensson's
existence proof contributes almost nothing to the discussion on how exactly innite streams
should be ordered.
13Dubey (2011) and Dubey and Mitra (2011) investigate the role of the set Y of possible utility levels
and rene the results of Lauwers (2010a) and Zame (2007).
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5 Pareto dominating tails
The framework with an innite number of periods generates incompatibilities that are
easy to reconcile in a nite work. This section explains how to construct, starting from
an innite sequence of nite dimensional partial orderings, a partial ordering on X that
combines nite anonymity and strong Pareto. The following idea is at the basis of the
construction. If the innite stream x Pareto dominates y, all generations unanimously
(and independently) agree to rank x above y. If, for some T , the innite tail x+T Pareto
dominates y+T , then from T + 1 onwards each generation agrees to rank x above y. The
problem, in this case, reduces to check whether the anonymous aggregative decision of
the nite horizon society f1; 2; : : : ; Tg agrees with the unanimous decision of generations
T + 1; T + 2; : : : ; T + k; : : :.
Before we explain the construction, let us list four well documented ranking relations on
the nite dimensional Euclidean space Rn: the Suppes-Sen grading principle %Sn, the util-
itarian ordering %Un , the leximin ordering %Ln , and the generalized Lorenz partial ordering
%Gn .14
We need some extra notation. For each n-tuple a in Rn let a+ be a rearrangement of
a that satises a[1]  a[2]      a[n]. Let Ln denote the lexicographic ordering on the
set of non-decreasing n-tuples: a+ Ln b+ if (a[1]; a[2];    ; a[k 1]) = (b[1]; b[2]; : : : ; b[k 1]) and
a[k]  b[k] for some k = 1; 2; : : : ; n.
For each a and b in Rn we have
a %Sn b if a+  b+;
a %Un b if a1 + a2 +   + an  b1 + b2 +   + bn;
a %Ln b if a+ Ln b+;
a %Gn b if a[1] + a[2] +   + a[k]  b[1] + b[2] +   + b[k]; k = 1; 2; : : : ; n;
All four ranking rules combine (nite) anonymity and strong Pareto. As a matter of fact,
the Suppes-Sen grading principle %Sn is a subrelation to each partial ordering on Rn that
satises anonymity and strong Pareto. Next, the rankings %Un and %Ln are both complete.
The utilitarian rule orders vectors according to the sum of the utilities. The Suppes-Sen
grading principle, the leximin rule, and the generalized Lorenz criterion make decisions
after rewriting the n-tuples in increasing order. The leximin rule judges the n-tuple with
the highest lowest utility level as being better; if these lowest levels are the same for the
two n-tuples, then the ranking is based on the second lowest utilities; and so forth. The
generalized Lorenz criterion is incomplete, e.g. it is unable to compare the vectors (0; 3)
and (1; 1). All these nite dimensional relations are easy to extend towards the framework
of innite streams. We will explain how this can be done by means of an arbitrary sequence
of orderings.
14We refer to Suppes (1966), Sen (1971), Hammond (1976), d'Aspremont and Gevers (1977), and
Shorrocks (1983). Bossert and Weymark (2004) provide an excellent overview.
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Consider a sequence %1;%2; : : : ;%n; : : : of (partial) rankings the subscript of which
reects the dimension or length of the vectors it compares, i.e. for each n, the relation %n
is dened on Rn. A rst method to construct a relation %1 on the set X is as follows:
x %1 y if there exists a T in N such that x T %T y T and x+T  y+T :
Two innite streams x and y for which the innite tail x+T dominates y+T are comparable
if, according to %T , the head x T is not worse than y T . In order to decide whether the
innite stream x is at least as good as y it is necessary that (i) from some generation T +1
onwards each individual generation t prefers x to y on the basis that the level xt is at
least as good as yt and (ii) the nite horizon society f1; 2; : : : ; Tg considers x T at least as
good as y T on the basis of the relation %T . In other words, a nite society judges on the
basis of the nite social welfare relation and all future generations unanimously concur this
judgement. If the relation %1 is able to rank two innite streams, then Pareto dominance
applies to their tails. The relation %1 is a partial ranking. The following transfer of
properties from %t towards %1 is obvious: in case each %t satises anonymity or strong
Pareto, then the innite version %1 also meets the axiom.
To illustrate the relations %U1, %L1, %S1, and %G1 we consider the streams
x = (:3; :3; : : : ; :3| {z }
3001 times
; :5; :5; : : : ; :5; : : :),
y = (:2; :2; : : : ; :2| {z }
2000 times
; :5; :5; : : : ; :5; : : :),
z = (:1; :1; : : : ; :1| {z }
1000 times
; :3; :3; : : : ; :3| {z }
1000 times
; :5; :5; : : : ; :5; : : :).
The innite horizon utilitarian rule %U1 considers y and z equally good, and strictly better
than x. The innite horizon leximin rule %L1 ranks x strictly above y, and y strictly above
z. The rule %G1 ranks y strictly above z and is unable to compare x and y, and x and
z. The innite Suppes-Sen grading principle %S1 is a subrelation to each ranking criterion
that satises nite anonymity and strong Pareto. The Suppes-Sen grading principle is
unable to compare any pair of the streams x, y, and z. Characterizations were obtained
by means of the following axioms.
Partial translation scale invariance (Basu and Mitra 2007). For each x and y in X
and for each  in RN, if x % y, x+T = y+T , and x +  and y +  belong to X, then
x+  % y + .
The axiom requires that preferences are invariant to changes in the origins of the utility
indices used in the various periods and should be interpreted as an innite version of unit
interpersonal comparability (Sen 1977, d'Aspremont and Gevers 1977).
Hammond equity (Hammond 1976, Asheim and Tungodden 2004). For each x and y in
X, for each i and j in N, if xt = yt for each t dierent from i and j, and yj > xj > xi > yi,
then x % y.
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Start from an innite stream y. Bring a better-o generation j and a worse-o gener-
ation i closer to each other. The resulting innite stream x is not worse than the original
stream y.
Strict transfer principle (Hara et al 2008, Bossert et al 2007). For each x and y in X,
for each i and j in N, if xt = yt for each t dierent from i and j, yj > xj  xi > yi, and
xi + xj = yi + yj, then x % y.
Start from an innite stream y. Execute a Pigou-Dalton transfer, i.e. a transfer of a
positive amount from a better-o to a worse-o generation so that the relative ranking
of the two agents does not change. The resulting innite stream x is not worse than the
original stream y.
The next theorem characterizes the four partial orderings.
Theorem 4. A partial ordering % on the setX satises strong Pareto and nite anonymity
if and only if %S1 is a subrelation to %. A partial ordering % on the set X satises strong
Pareto, nite anonymity, and partial translation scale invariance (resp. Hammond equity,
or the strict transfer principle) if and only if %U1 (resp. %L1, or %G1) is a subrelation to %.
For the characterization of the innite horizon Suppes-Sen grading principle %S1 we
refer to Banerjee (2006b) and Mitra and Basu (2007). Basu and Mitra (2007) introduce
and characterize the innite horizon utilitarian rule %U1. The transfer-sensitive innite
horizon rule %G1 and the innite horizon leximin rule %L1 are introduced and characterized
by Bossert et al (2007).
6 Decisive sets of horizons
Again we start from an innite sequence %1;%2; : : : ;%n; : : : of nite dimensional criteria.
Let x and y be two innite streams. For each t let the nite horizon society f1; 2; : : : ; tg
decide, on the basis of %t, whether or not x t should be considered at least as good as y t.
Consider the set
N(x; y) = ft in N jx t %t y tg:
The set N(x; y) collects all nite time horizons t for which the truncated vector x t is at
least as good as y t. In this section, the problem of ranking x not below y is reduced to
the question of whether or not the set N(x; y) is large enough. In case N(x; y) is equal to
N up to a nite set, one can argue that the innite stream x should not be ranked below
y. Indeed, for each t larger than some T , the aggregative judgement (on the basis of %t)
of the nite horizon society f1; 2; : : : ; tg considers x not worse than y.
Let F denote the collection of all subsets of N that are equal to N up to a nite set.
Then, we can dene the following relation on the set X of innite streams:
x %F y if N(x; y) 2 F :
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An element of the collection F is a subset of N and can be interpreted as a decisive set. If
the set N(x; y) belongs to F , then N(x; y) is decisive and the stream x is judged to be at
least as good as y. If, in addition, also N(y; x) belongs to F , then x and y are considered
equally good. If, however, N(y; x) does not belong to F , then x is strictly preferred to y.15
Let us list the relevant properties of F . The empty set does not belong to F , the empty
set is never decisive. The collection F is closed for intersection, i.e. for each A and B in F ,
the intersection A \B also belongs to F . As a consequence, the relation %F is transitive.
Furthermore, the collection F is closed for supersets, i.e. if A belongs to F , then a superset
B  A also belongs to F . A superset of a decisive coalition is in its turn decisive. These
three properties turn the collection F into a lter.
To illustrate the approach, start from the sequence %Un of utilitarian orderings and
consider the innite streams
u = (:2; 0; :1; 0; :1; 0; :1; 0; : : :) and v = (0; :1; 0; :1; 0; :1; 0; :1; : : :):
The odd-indexed generations prefer u to v, while the even-indexed generations prefer v
to u.16 Hence, the tails do not dominate each other and the almost-unanimity-approach,
discussed in the previous section and denoted by %U1, is unable to rank these streams. On
the other hand, the set N(u; v) coincides with N and N(v; u) is empty, each nite horizon
society has an aggregative strict preference for u. We obtain
N(u; v) 2 F and N(v; u) =2 F ; hence u UF v:
Whatever the horizon t, the nite horizon society f1; 2; : : : ; tg when equipped with the
utilitarian rule %Ut considers|as a group|the stream u better than v.
The relation UF is known as the utilitarian overtaking criterion (Atsumi 1965, von
Weizsacker 1965). Fleurbaey and Michel (2003) study dierent versions and extensions of
this overtaking criterion and introduce the method of decisive horizons. We refer to Brock
(1970), Asheim and Tungodden (2004), Basu and Mitra (2007), and Asheim and Baner-
jee (2010) for the axiomatizations of the utilitarian and the leximin overtaking rule and
their catching-up versions. Starting from the axiomatizations in Theorem 4, an additional
consistency demand is sucient.
Let us return to the sequence %1;%2; : : : ;%n; : : : and the lter F . It is obvious that
the relation %F is not complete, even in case each %n is complete. In order to reduce the
incompleteness of %F it is sucient to enlarge the collection F of decisive sets. The more
decisive sets, the more pairs of streams can be ranked.
A strengthening of the nite anonymity axiom can be used to extend the partial order
%F . Let us introduce some further notation. A permutation is a bijective map  : N! N.
For each innite stream x, the composition x  is a map from N to Y and can be written
as
x   = (x(1); x(2); : : : ; x(t); : : :):
15Note the similarity with the decisive sets in Arrow's impossibility theorem. See also Fleurbaey and
Michel (2003).
16Basu and Mitra (2007) discuss this example.
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A permutation is said to be nite if for some T in N we have (t) = t for each t 
T . A permutation is said to be xed step if there exists a natural number k, such that
(f1; 2; : : : ; kng) = f1; 2; : : : ; kng for each n in N. The permutation  that switches the
numbers 2j   1 and 2j for each j is a xed step permutation with k = 2. Applied to the
stream y = (0; :1; 0; :1; 0; :1; 0; :1; : : :) we obtain
y   = (:1; 0; :1; 0; :1; 0; :1; 0; : : :):
Note that a nite permutation is xed step. We now formulate an anonymity axiom that
is stronger than nite anonymity.
Fixed step anonymity (Lauwers 1997b). Let x be an innite stream and let  be a xed
step permutation. Then, x   and x are equally good.
The imposition of xed step anonymity forces indierence between the utility streams
v = (0; :1; 0; :1; 0; :1; 0; :1; : : :) and z = v   = (:1; 0; :1; 0; :1; 0; :1; 0; : : :):
A preference for z above v indeed reveals some form of impatience. Fixed step anonymity
is compatible with strong Pareto (Lauwers 1997b). Moreover, the combination of xed
step anonymity and Pareto dominance ranks rank u = (:2; 0; :1; 0; :1; 0; :1; 0; : : :) above v.
In contrast to nite anonymity, however, the imposition of xed step anonymity conicts
with the combination of strong Pareto and stationarity. Indeed, a xed step anonymous
rule considers the streams
a = (1; 0; 1; 0; : : : ; 1; 0; : : :); b = (0; 1; 1; 0; : : : ; 1; 0; : : :); and c = (0; 1; 0; 1; : : : ; 0; 1; : : :)
equally valuable. Stream b is equal to a up to the switch in the rst two coordinates, and
stream c is obtained from a after switching the odd and even coordinates. Stationarity
implies indierence between b+1 and c+1. Since c+1 coincides with a, we have indierence
between c+1 and c. Because of strong Pareto, the stream b+1 is strictly preferred to c.
Thus, the incompatibility is established.17
Let G be the collection of sets that are up to a nite set equal to kN = fk; 2k; : : : ; nk; : : :g
for some k. The collection G is a lter. If the nite dimensional relations%n are anonymous,
then the relation%G is xed step anonymous and extends the relation%F . Lauwers (1997b),
Fleurbaey and Michel (2003), Kamaga and Kojima (2009, 2010), Asheim and Banerjee
(2010), and Sakai (2010) discuss and axiomatize xed step anonymous criteria.
In order to extend the partial ordering %G to a complete ordering, the relations %n need
to be complete and the collection U of decisive sets should meet the following requirement:
for each A  N; either A 2 U or N  A 2 U ;
the either-or being exclusive. Indeed, if the collection U satises this demand, then for
an arbitrary pair x and y, either the set N(x; y), or N(y; x), or both belong to U and the
innite streams x and y are comparable. The following denition and lemma summarizes.
Denition (ultralter). A collection U of subsets of N is said to be an ultralter, if
17Demichelis et al (2010) study axioms of anonymity in combination with strong Pareto and stationarity.
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 the empty set ? does not belong to U ,
 for each A and B in U , the intersection A \B belongs to U ,
 for each A  N either A 2 U or its complement N  A 2 U .
An ultralter U that includes F is said to be free and satises \UA = ?. A nite subset
of N does not belong to a free ultralter. The existence of a free ultralter follows from
the Axiom of Choice (formulated as Zorn's Lemma). Free ultralters are non-constructible
objects. As a consequence, the next lemma (Fleurbaey and Michel 2003, Lauwers 2010a)
provides a way to obtain non-constructive existence results. In contrast, the lter G and
the relation is %G are well dened.
Lemma. Let %t be a relation on Y t for each t in N and let U be a free ultralter on N.
Dene the relation %U on X = Y N by
x %U y if N(x; y) 2 U :
If each relation %t satises the axiom of transitivity, completeness, nite anonymity, strong
Pareto, Hammond equity, or the strict transfer principle, then the relation %U satises the
same axioms.
While the relation %U is not relevant from a practical point of view, the subrelation
%G will be incomplete, but is still dened in a constructive way. On the other hand, the
above lemma cannot be used to conclude that a certain set of axioms necessarily leads to
a ranking rule that is non-constructible. The proof of Theorem 3, for example, appeals to
the concept of non-Ramsey sets and shows how the existence of an ordering that combines
intermediate Pareto and nite anonymity implies the existence of such a non-constructible
object.18
7 Strong anonymity
The principles of nite anonymity and xed step anonymity are concepts of procedural
equity: the action of a permutation upon an innite stream does not change the distribution
of the levels in the innite stream. In contrast equity principles as Hammond's equity and
the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle are called consequentialist equity concepts: they judge
the eect of a change in the distribution in the levels. This section discusses the strongest
form of procedural equity, labeled strong anonymity.
18A non-Ramsey set is a subset N of the collection N1 of all innite subsets of N such that for each
element J in N the collection of innite subsets of J intersects both N and its complement N1   N .
The technique developed in Lauwers (2010a) to dene non-Ramsey sets has been used by Dubey and
Mitra (2013) to show that a complete ranking that combines strong Pareto and Hammond equity (or the
strict transfer principle) is non-constructible. See also Dubey (2011), Dubey and Mitra (2011, 2012), and
Banerjee and Dubey (2013).
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Strong anonymity. For each innite stream x in X and each permutation  : N ! N,
we have x  x  .
This axiom conicts with weak Pareto (Fleurbaey and Michel 2003). We present two
examples. The rst one comes from Fleurbeay and Michel (2003):
t (: : : ; 9, 7, 5, 3, 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, : : :),
x = (: : : ; 1
9
, 1
7
, 1
5
, 1
3
, 1, 2-1
2
, 2-1
4
, 2-1
6
, 2-1
8
, : : :),
y = (: : : ; 1
7
, 1
5
, 1
3
, 1, 2-1
2
, 2-1
4
, 2-1
6
, 2-1
8
, 2- 1
10
, : : :).
The rst line lists the moments in time. The even indexed moments are written in in-
creasing order, the odd indexed moments are written in decreasing order (or reading from
right to left, in increasing order). The second line presents the innite stream x. The even
indexed values increase an have a limit equal to 2. The odd indexed values decrease (as
time moves forward) and have a limit equal to 0. The third line lists the very same values
in the same order as in the previous line. Each value, however, is shifted one place to the
left. The result is that the stream y is just a permutation of the stream x that strongly
dominates x, i.e. for each t we have yt > xt. Conclude that strong anonymity conicts
with weak Pareto.
The second example considers a discrete setting. The next two streams shelter an
innite number of zeroes and an innite number of ones:
z99 = (1; 1; : : : ; 1| {z }
99 times
; 0; : : : ; 1; 1; : : : ; 1| {z }
99 times
; 0; : : :)  z1 = (1; 0; 0; : : : ; 0| {z }
99 times
; : : : ; 1; 0; 0; : : : ; 0| {z }
99 times
; : : :):
There is a bijective map (permutation) that transforms z1 into z99. Hence, according
to strong anonymity, the innite stream z99 with 99 percent of the generations at level
1 is equally good as the stream z1 with 1 percent at level 1. In the discrete setting,
with Y = f0; 1g strong anonymity conicts with intermediate Pareto (Van Liedekerke and
Lauwers 1997).
Note the dierence between the two examples. In the rst example, the distribution
of the dierent levels remains untouched after being permuted (because all the dierent
levels occur only a nite number of times over the innite number of dierent periods). In
contrast, in the second example the volume|and hence the distribution|of zeros changes
from 1 percent to 99 percent when permuting z99 into z1.
The most familiar rules that satises strong anonymity are the Rawlsian inmum-rule
and the limit inferior-rule (Rawls 1999). Both these rules satisfy strong anonymity, mono-
tonicity (if x  y, then x % y), continuity with respect to the sup-topology, and Hammond
equity. Characterizations are obtained by Lauwers (1997c) and Chambers (2009).19
We close this section with the rank-discounted utilitarian rule. This rule, introduced
by Zuber and Asheim (2012), also satises strong anonymity. First, we discuss two sets,
X+ and X, of innite utility streams for which the axioms of strong Pareto and strong
19Doyen and Martinet (2012) apply the maximin rule in a general dynamic economic model.
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anonymity are not in conict. The domain X+ collects the nowhere decreasing streams,
i.e. streams x with xt  xt+1 for each t in N. For each stream x in X+, it is impossible
to permute x into y such that y strongly Pareto dominates x. The set X is dened as the
set of innite streams that can be rewritten as a nowhere decreasing stream. The set X is
closed under all permutations and within the set X the axioms of strong anonymity and
strong Pareto are compatible. In addition, each innite stream in X has a well dened
lowest level, second lowest level, and so forth. Hence, for each innite stream x in X a
corresponding non-decreasing stream x[ ] = (x[1]; x[2]; : : : ; x[t]; : : :) is dened. Furthermore,
the limit `(x) is well dened for each x in X. Indeed, the increasing stream x[ ] associated
to x has a unique point of accumulation. The innite stream x in X either remains below
`(x) (for each t, xt < `(x)), or reaches `(x) after a nite number of time moments (for each
t big enough, xt = `(x)).
Zuber and Asheim (2012) dene the rank-discounted utilitarian rule
R : X  ! R : x 7 ! R(x) = (1  )
X
r 1u(x[r]);
with 0 <  < 1 and u a continuous and increasing map. The factor (1  ) normalizes the
total sum of the weights to 1. In contrast to the time-discounted utilitarian rule, the weight
(1 )r 1 corresponds to the rank a particular value xt = x[r] obtains after rewriting x in
increasing order. The highest weight (1 ) is attached to the moment t for which xt is the
lowest level, the second highest weight is attached to the moment with the second lowest
level, and so forth. The lower the valuext, the higher the weight attached to generation t.
The axiomatization of Koopmans' rule can be used to characterize the rank-discounted
utilitarian rule R when restricted to the domain X+ of increasing streams. Roughly,
the axioms of Koopmans are not imposed upon the whole collection X of innite streams.
Restricted axioms are imposed to order the setX+. Strong anonymity then extends the rule
R to the set X. When applied to the set X, the criterion R attaches weights to a generation
on the basis of the rank this generation obtains. Koopmans' rule uses discounting according
to the position in time, in contrast, the welfare function R uses discounting according to
the rank after rewriting the stream in increasing order.
Finally, Zuber and Asheim (2012) introduce an extended rank-discounted utilitarian
social welfare function on the set X of all innite streams:
R : X  ! R : x 7 ! R(x) = u(`(x)) + (1  )
jL(x)jX
r=1
r 1

u(x[r])  u(`(x))

;
with 0 <  < 1, `(x) the limit inferior of x, L(x)  N the set of indices t for which
xt < `(x), and u a continuous and increasing real valued function. The length of the
discounted sum in R(x) either is nite (if jL(x)j < +1) or innite (if jL(x)j = +1). In
words, take an innite stream x, let `(x) = lim inf(x) be the limit inferior of x, let L(x)
collect all generations t for which xt < `(x), and apply the rank-discounted utilitarian rule
upon the stream x restricted to L(x) which is, if necessary, supplemented with innitely
many values `(x).
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For example, the welfare function R attaches value zero to the above innite streams
z1 and z99. The imposition of strong anonymity (on the set X) implies a cost: the welfare
function R does not satisfy weak Pareto. The innite stream (1; 1=2; 1=3; : : : ; 1=n; : : :) is
equally good as the zero stream. In conclusion, when applied to the set X of all innite
streams, the criterion R renes the `Rawlsian' limit inferior as it only pays attention to
those generations that obtain a level below or equal to this limit inferior.20
8 Sustainable discounted utilitarianism
The innite horizon utilitarian rule %U1 imposes
x = (x1; z + "; z + "; : : : ; z + "; : : :)  y = (y1; z; z; : : : ; z; : : :);
for each x1, y1, z, and " > 0. Whatever the sacrice y1   x1 of the rst generation,
the innitely many "'s bridge the gap and overtake the innite stream y. The axiom of
Hammond equity for the future modies the above ranking as follows.
Hammond equity for the future (Asheim and Tungodden 2004). For each x1, y1, z,
and " > 0, we have
x = (x1; z + "; z + "; : : : ; z + "; : : :)  y = (y1; z; z; : : : ; z; : : :);
as soon y1 > x1 > z + ".
Similar to Hammond's equity axiom, bringing the levels y1 and z closer to each other
(towards x1 and z+ ") results in a better stream. In contrast to Hammond's axiom, where
only two generations are involved, now each generation is involved. The transfer from
the better-o rst generation leads to a sustained increase in the level of all subsequent
generations while the rst generation remains the better of.21 The early generations are
not condemned to starvation in order to maximize the welfare for later generations.
The imposition of Hammond equity of the future comes at the cost of weakening strong
Pareto and the axiom of independence. For example, an improvement for the rst gener-
ation is not taken into account in case this rst generation is better o than the future
generations. Asheim et al (2010, 2012) introduce and characterize the following class of
sustainable discounted utilitarian rules:
S : X  ! R : x 7 !
(
(1  )U(x1) + S(x+1) if U(x1)  S(x+1);
S(x+1) if U(x1) > S(x+1);
with  in the open interval (0; 1) and U(x) = S(x; x; : : : ; x; : : :). Observe the similarity
with the time-discounted utilitarian rule,
D(x) = (1  )u(x1) + D(x+1):
20Asheim and Zuber (2013) study the behavior of the rank-discounted utilitarian rule as  goes to zero
and show the convergence of R towards a strongly anonymous leximin relation.
21Also Banerjee (2006a), Asheim et al (2007), Alcantud and Garca-Sanz (2010), Dubey and Mitra
(2013) consider Hammond equity for the future.
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Both social welfare functions are dened in a recursive way. The sustainable discounted
utilitarian rule gives zero weight to those generations that are better o then their future
generations. As a consequence the sustainable discounted utilitarian rule violates weak
Pareto: again, the innite stream (1; 1=2; 1=3; : : : ; 1=n; : : :) and the zero stream are con-
sidered equally good. On the other hand, when restricted to the domain of non-decreasing
streams, the rule coincides with both the time-discounted and the rank-discounted utili-
tarian rule.
The sustainable discounted utilitarian rule satises continuity with respect to the sup-
topology, monotonicity, stationarity, and the following weakening of the independence ax-
iom.
Separable future. For each x and y in X and for each t in N,
if x % (x t; y+t); then (y t; x+t) % y:
In words, if two innite streams have the same head up to time T , then the ranking
of these streams does not depend upon this common head. Asheim (2010) provides the
following example to motivate the rejection of the other part of Koopmans' independence
axiom. Consider the streams
a = (0; :75; 1; 1; : : : ; 1; : : :) and b = (:25; :25; 1; 1; : : : ; 1; : : :):
Assume that a is preferred to b. Then, it is not obvious to rank the modications
a = (0; :75; :25; :25; :25; : : : ; :25; : : :) and b = (:25; :25; :25; :25; : : : ; :25; : : :)
in the same way. The common tails might inuence our look upon the conict between
the couple (0; :75) and (:25; :25). The value :75 is the second worst-o in a, while it is the
best-o in a. The sustainable discounted utilitarian rule S treats the same value but at
dierent ranks in a dierent way.
9 Chichilnisky's sustainable preference
Graciela Chichilnisky (1996, 1997) introduces the axioms of non-dictatorship and charac-
terizes a whole class of social welfare orderings that satises these axioms in combination
with completeness, continuity, and representability. We recall these axioms.
Dictatorship of the present. For each x, y, v, and w in X, if x  y, then there exists
a T in N such that
(x (T+k); v+(T+k))  (y (T+k); w+(T+k)) for each k in N:
A rule that satises this axiom ranks two innite streams on the basis of their heads
(i.e. the truncated streams). Time-discounted utilitarianism is the prime example that
satises this axiom. The time-discounted rule just puts the (very) long run oside.
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Dictatorship of the future. For each x, y, v, and w in X, if x  y, then there exists a
T in N such that
(v (T+k); x+(T+k))  (w (T+k); x+(T+k)) for each k in N:
A rule that satises this axiom ranks two innite streams on the basis of their tails.
The map x 7! lim inf x is an example. This map looks for the inmum of the set of
accumulation points, and is not sensitive for changes in the head of the innite stream.
Furthermore, observe the conict between the axioms of strong Pareto and of dictatorship
of the future.
The axioms of non-dictatorship impose that the axioms of dictatorship do not hold.22
Many rules meet the axioms of non-dictatorship. The Pareto dominating tail rules %S1,
%U1, %L1, and %U1; the xed step anonymous G-rules %SG , %UG , %LG , and %UG all satisfy non-
dictatorship of the future (as they all satisfy strong Pareto) and non-dictatorship of the
present (the criteria are sensitive for shifts in the tails). None of these criteria, however, is
complete.
Theorem 5 (Chichilnisky 1996). Let the ordering % on the set of bounded streams satisfy
continuity with respect to the sup-topology, independence, non-dictatorship of the present,
and non-dictatorship of the future. Then, the ordering % is represented by a continuous
function
C : x 7 !
1X
t=1
t xt + '(x);
where the real numbers t are all positive and add up to a nite number, and ' a purely
nitely additive map.
Chichilnisky uses the term sustainable preferences for the social welfare functions char-
acterized by the previous theorem. The sustainable preference C decomposes into two
parts. The rst part, x 7!Pt xt, is countably additive, satises strong Pareto, and cap-
tures the short run. The second part, x 7! '(x), is purely nitely additive and captures the
long run. This decomposition follows from the representation of a nitely additive measure
on the set N, i.e. a map that (i) assigns to each subset of N a nonnegative number, and
(ii) assigns to the union of two disjoint sets the sum of their numbers.23
A purely nitely additive map is typically obtained by means of Hahn-Banach's theorem
or by means of a free ultralter (e.g. it selects the unique accumulation point the converging
subsequence of which is indexed by a set that belongs to the free ultralter). Such a
purely nitely additive map, although it is continuous with respect to the sup-topology
and nitely additive, is a non-constructible object (Lauwers 2009, 2010b). Obviously,
the representability of a non-constructible relation does not change the non-constructible
22Ayong Le Kama et al (2014) study social welfare functions and introduce two axioms related to non-
dictatorship: never-decisiveness of the future and never-decisiveness of the present. Depending upon the
domain, a possibility or an impossibility result is obtained.
23We refer to Yosida and Hewitt (1952), Rao (1958), and Peressini (1967).
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nature of the relation. Here, the map ' provides us an example of a continuous and additive
representation of a non-constructible relation. Representability by means of a continuous,
monotonic, and additive map does not imply constructibility.24
There are, however, at least two ways to circumvent this problem. One can restrict the
domain to, for example, those innite utility streams which exhibit a well dened|without
recurse to non-constructive mathematics|and nite limiting behavior (Chichilnisky 2009).
Alternatively, one can replace the map ' with, for example, the map lim inf which looks
for the inmum of the set of accumulation points.25
Finally, we mention the similarities and dierences between the results of Chichilnisky
and Koopmans. Both social welfare functions satisfy continuity with respect to the sup-
topology, strong Pareto, and independence. Stationarity is violated by Chichilnisky's crite-
rion but satised by discounted utilitarianism. Non-dictatorship of the present is satised
by Chichilnisky's criterion but violated by the discounted utilitarian rule.
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